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The redistributive effects of four mixed fiscal system in which redistribution in 
cash is paired with redistribution in kind are investigated. A private good is offered 
by both the public and the private sector, at a non-zero price in both cases. Thus, the 
market is vertically segmented and the quality differences are used to select recipients 
on the basis of their income. This paper shows how an appropriate selection of 
recipients can add redistributive power to an already redistributive taxation system, 
while universal public provision never does. A numerical simulation based on Italian 
data gives some policy insights.
* We would like to thank prof. Augustin Maravall and prof. Louis Phlips for their 
help and comments. A special thank to the participants in the 1994 EEA Summer 
School for invaluable suggestions. Anna Pettini is the author of sections 1-5. Stefano 
Nardelli is the author of appendix 1-3.
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According to the second theorem of welfare economics, the central plan­
ner of a ’’ convex economy” can induce any redistribution of initial re­
sources on the frontier of all achievable allocations, by the means of lump 
sum taxes. This theorem, however, is unhelpful to the central planner 
whenever the conditions for a market failure occur; in fact, when the 
government possesses incomplete information about the characteristics 
of private agents, the optimal redistribution cannot be implemented by a 
system of lump sum taxes. Thus, in a second best environment, policy in­
struments for redistribution are both optimal taxation and redistribution 
in kind, namely public provision of private goods.
The issue of redistribution in kind has been addressed in the eco­
nomic literature in a rather atypical way: while the applied literature 
on poverty and income distribution usually considers payments in-kind 
as a crucial part of total income, the theoretical side of the literature 
usually neglects them; one of the reasons is a supposed greater efficiency 
of redistribution in cash, which requires less information and makes the 
recipients happier because of a greater freedom in the use of the received 
money.
On the other hand, governments make considerable use of redistri­
bution in kind: the category of merit goods1 is mostly supplied in kind 
in many industrialized countries. Considering the case of Italy, 59% of 
final governments consumption expenditure in 1990 was on goods with 
some redistributive power2; the same category of goods represented 51% 
of total current outlays3. These figures indicate why the cost of uni­
versal public provision of medical care and education, for example, is 
frequently considered unbearable, and why public provision of private 
goods is often challanged. We believe that the correct question should 
not be whether or not such public provision is worthwhile , but rather
1We interpret merit goods only as goods with some redistributive power.
2These figures take the OECD list of social indicators into account.
3 These include final consumption expenditure, subsidies and other current trans­



























































































under what conditions it can be worthwhile.
This paper analyzes the progressivity of different fiscal arrange­
ments. The question we address is whether a mixed fiscal system, i.e. 
a system involving both redistribution in kind and in cash, is able to 
increase the redistributive effects of income taxation and under what 
conditions. This question is relevant for several reasons.
First, the disincentive effects induced by high tax rates could be 
avoided (or lessened) by lowering tax rates in a mixed fiscal policy (where 
the redistributive target is achieved by combining redistribution in cash 
and in kind). Second, if the selection of recipients of the publicly offered 
private good is expanded to consider more than just one parameter (in­
come), the efficiency of the overall tax structure can increase as agents 
reveal their characteristics more truthfully. Third, a mixed fiscal policy, 
even with the same degree of progressiveness as a pure taxation structure, 
makes it possibile to assign private (merit) goods to needy individuals.
We construe redistribution in kind as public provision of a private 
good at a non-zero price and not rationed. We set up a framework in 
which the government pursues the redistributive policy both by a progres­
sive system of general taxation (redistribution in cash4) and by providing 
a private good (redistribution in kind). This mix of redistribution in cash 
and in kind can be of four types since ^redistribution in cash can be car­
ried out through linear income taxes or non-linear taxation and ii) the 
private good can either be provided universally or selectively5. In order 
to select people with lower income, the public sector may choose to offer 
the private good at a price and quality lower than that in the private
4A progressive income tax can be called redistributive in its own right, regardless 
of what is done with the revenue. This is because, relative to equal-yield proportional 
taxation, post tax income is redistributed from rich to poor in the presence of pro­
gression. If the tax does not involve any re-ranking of income units (it is incentive 
preserving), the extent of this redistribution can be seen in the trasformation from the 
Lorenz curve for pre-tax incomes to the Lorenz curve for post-tax incomes (Lambert, 
1993).
5 A good is publicly universally provided if it is supplied to all individuals. A 
good is publicly selectively supplied if the market is segmented, so that a not-perfect 




























































































sector. The higher quality of the private market encourages richer in­
dividuals to choose ’’ private” , though they are nonetheless asked to pay 
general taxes to finance the public supply of the private good.
In section 2 we define a non linear income tax schedule and ana­
lyze its progressivity when parameters change. In section 3 we check the 
validity of the conjecture that uniform public provision of private goods 
is not a proper system of redistribution . We then analyze the progres­
siveness of four mixes of redistribution in cash and in kind, where linear 
and non-linear income tax functions are paired with the two types of 
public provision of private goods mentioned above. Finally, a numerical 
simulation is performed to study the role played by quality and price 
differences in the redistributive policy.
2 Progressiveness in a two brakets income 
tax system
In this section we analyze the progressiveness of the tax function used in 
the model described in section 3. We then compare the progressiveness 
of the original tax function with that of the same tax function in which a 
parameter has been changed. This analysis is necessary both to ascertain 
that the tax function by which we define a progressive taxation system is 
actually progressive, and to read the results of the numerical simulation 
discussed in section 4, and shown in Appendix 3.
Progressiveness of a tax function is defined as follows
Definition 1 A tax function is progressive iff the average tax rate 
t.(y) =  T(y)/y is increasing in y.
Let us define a progressive income tax function as
0 < y <  y
y > y (1)




























































































P roposition  1 If y is lognormally distributed, then T (y) is progressive 
when y < kE(y).
P roof: See appendix 2.
Define two more income tax functions to be compared with T(y) as
Appendix 1 shows that the lognormal distribution provides the best 
fit for the available data on incomes in Italy. We therefore assume that 
income is distributed as a lognormal. A progressive tax function, follow­
ing Lambert (1989), should satisfy (at least in a weak form) the three 
properties listed below. A measure of the extent by which the rich pay 
proportionately more taxes than the poor is given by either the Lorenz 
curve for tax payments or the Lorenz curve for for pre-tax and post-tax 
incomes, so that the properties can be formulated as follows:
P roperty  1 A tax function Ti has, for all y, a greater tax liability 
progression than a tax function T j iff for every unequal pre-tax income 
distribution the tax burden resulting from T) is distributed less equally (in 
the sense of relative Lorenz domination) than the tax burden resulting
P roperty  2 A tax function T) has, for all y, a lower residual incom e 
progression than a tax function Tj iff for every unequal pre-tax in­
come distribution the post-tax incomes are distributed more equally (in
from Tj.




























































































P roperty  3 Assume equiproportionate pre-tax income growth. Then a 
tax function T] has, for all y, a greater average tax progression than 
a tax function Tj iff for every unequal pre-tax income distribution the 
average tax rate responsiveness of Tx is greater than that of Tj.
T\(y) has greater tax liability progression, lower residual income 
progression , and greater average rate progression than T(y). For the 
sake of readability, we do not prove these assertions formally6, but a 
graphical intuition for these properties is given in Appendix 3, figures 
1-4.
The behaviour of progressiveness when T(y) becomes T-ffy), namely 
when y changes, has a discontinuity because the two extreme cases, i.e. 
y =  0 and y =  oo, give both a case of non-redistribution in terms of 
Lorenz curves (when y — 0, oo the non-linear tax schedule is equivalent 
to a linear one). To the contrary, when 0 < y <  oo, Lorenz curves of 
income distribution are affected by changes of y. To our purpose, we 
limit the attention to those cases for which the progressivity of the tax 
function is higher when y increases (fig.2 and 4).
3 Redistribution in cash and redistribu­
tion in kind
Consider the following four mixed fiscal systems where redistribution in 
cash is paired with redistribution in kind.
i. Linear income tax rates and uniform public provision of a private 
good.
ii. Non-linear income tax rates and uniform public provision of private 
good.
iii. Linear income tax rates and selective public provision of private 
good.
6T\(y) could in fact be shown to have greater average rate progression than T(y) 




























































































iv. Non-linear income tax rates and selective public provision of private 
good.
Assuming pre-tax incomes unequally distributed, how is the dis­
tribution of income affected when redistribution in cash is paired with 
redistribution in kind? In other words, what is the overall progressiveness 
in the four cases listed above?
3.1 Uniform public provision of a private good
Consider a progressive income taxation scheme. How is its redistributive 
power affected if it is paired with a selective supply of a private good, 
or with a fiscal program whereby the social supply of the same good 
is universal? In fact, a pure progressive income taxation schedule loses 
part of its progressivity if paired with uniform public provision of private 
goods. For example, consider a public supply of health care in terms 
of its money equivalent transfer, paired with simple progressive income 
taxation in which marginal tax rates lower with income and are piecewise 
constant. If an identical money transfer is given to two individuals whose 
incomes are at two different points at which the tax rate changes both 
of them will end up having to pay a higher rate when the thresholds 
are crossed. Thus, if the marginal increase in tax payments are seen as 
payments for health care, the fiscal schedule loses progressivity since the 
poorer individual is asked to pay a higher marginal contribution for the 
socially offered good. Beyond this particular example, it can be argued 
that a public program of universal provision of a private good does not 
add redistributive effects to a non-regressive tax program, as shown by 
the following propositions.
P roposition  2 A uniform, public provision of h does not add any redis­
tributive power to a linear income tax function 7.





























































































Proof: See appendix 2.
P roposition  3 A uniform public provision of h does not add redistribu­
tive power to a non-linear progressive tax function.
P roof: Along the lines of the proof of Prop. 2
Thus, uniform public provision of a private good does not affect 
the distribution of income when it is paired with redistribution in cash 
(via general taxation). In spite of this, the literature has often treated 
uniform public provision of private goods as a form of redistribution.
3.2 Selective public provision of a private good
Consider now the two mixed fiscal policies defined at points iii) and iv) 
above. In the remainder of this paper we argue that selective public 
provision of a private good alongside linear taxation can almost trivially 
be more redistributive than the basic redistribution in cash, while this is 
not true in case iv): a non-uniform public provision of h may or may not 
add redistributive power to a non-linear, progressive income tax func­
tion. The model below helps to analyze the case of progressive taxation 
and selective public provision of a private good. It describes individual 
optimal choices as responses to a public program of uniform or selective 
provision of a private good such as health care. When health care is 
selectively supplied, optimal choices yield a critical income level below 
which people opt in for the social provision and above which people opt 
out, i.e. opt for the private market. This income threshold, together 
with the tax rate cut-off levels, defines a new distribution of income to 
be compared with the pre-tax distribution.
An index of redistribution is then defined. This index is constructed 
under the assumption that a necessary condition for redistribution is that 
richer8 people opt for the private market.




























































































It should be stressed that this calculation is carried out under the 
assumption that pre-tax incomes (i.e. labour supply) are fixed; in other 
words, the problem of optimal taxation will already have been solved. 
This hypothesis is critical, because people can in fact leave the labour 
force, and because those who remain in it can adjust the amount of 
labour they supply and thereby modify the original income distribution: 
nevertheless we will stick to this hypothesis, in order to focus on the 
additional effect of redistribution in kind beyond that of a redistribution 
in cash. For this purpose, we shall assume that the choice between public 
and private provision takes place only after tax payments have been 
made, and that no information about the price of privately and socially 
supplied health care is available before these tax payments.
The model proposed below is positive rather than normative: it 
is concerned with the identification of the redistributive effects of mar­
ket segmentation in the provision of a private good, rather than with 
identifying the welfare implications of alternative fiscal arrangements.
3.2.1 The m odel
Let us assume that individuals consume a composite private commodity 
as well as health care. Preferences are defined over these two goods as 
well as the quality of the latter. Assume a quasi-concave utility function
U =  U (x,h j,0) j  =  s,p  (4)
where x is the amount of the composite private commodity, h is health 
care and 9 is the quality of h . Whether socially (hs) or privately (hp) 
provided, the amount of hj is free to vary i.e. it is never rationed. 8 takes 
the values 9 =  0 for hs and 8 =  a  for hp, with a > 0.
Let us also represent the income taxation function by T(y) (de­
scribed in section 2). T(y) is piecewise linear with two brakets with tax 
rates t\ and f2 (b  <  t-z)- applied to incomes respectively smaller and 
greater than y. y is thus a control variable for the government, and di­
vides people into group 1 and group 2, to which we refer by the index i. 




























































































of view of this analysis, ft- acts as a poll tax, since labour supply, and 
thus income, is assumed fixed when the choice between hs and hp takes 
place. Let us finally assume that distribution of income across consumers 
is distributed as a lognormal 9, with distribution function <!>(?/).
Individuals face the budget constraint
y(d = p x  +  qshs +  qphp (5)
where
| y{dl) =  (i -  h )y  y < y
\ Vd] =  (i -  h )(y - y )  +  ( 1 -  h )y y > y
is disposable income after tax, hp and hs represent health care sup­
plied socially or privately; p is the price of the composite commodity x, 
qs is a user charge for hs and qp is the price for hp (qs is assumed to 
be smaller than qp, because of differences in quality and because hs is 
assumed to be financed also by tax contributions of individuals who opt 
out of the public provision). hs is not retradable10.
Two additional constraints are necessary to describe the individ­
ual’s choice: consumption of both social and private provision of h is 
impossible but one of the two is compulsory. These conditions can be 
expressed as hs ■ hp =  0 and hs +  hp >  0.
There are two possible choices. One is to opt for the social provision 
and, consequently, for a lower quality of h, at a lower cost qs. and the
9 Appendix 1 shows that the lognormal distribution provides the best fit for avail­
able data on incomes in Italy. The numerical simulation uses the Italian income 
distribution.
10In the redistribution in kind literature, private goods are assumed to have the 
property of non-retradability. A private good is non-retradable if the recipient is 
either entirely unable to resell units of the commodity or would always be unwilling 
to sell given the discount that would have to be offered (Munro, 1988): if the public 
provision of in-kind transfers works, in the sense that any needy recipient obtain the 





























































































other is to choose the privately offered h, at the higher price qp to obtain 
higher quality health care.
The resulting indirect utility functions
Vs = U[{yf -  qXs)/pX,0\
Vp =  - q ph*p)/p,h*,a] j  =  s,p. (6)
determine the actual choice of each individual depending on whether 
Vt <  (>)Vj, . Thus, if a regularity condition holds 11, there is a value of 
income (y*b>) which divides people choosing hs from those choosing hp, 
i.e. the income level of the individual indifferent between the two options 
(Vs = Vp).
We have now three thresholds on the support of the income dis­
tribution. One is y. which is a control variable for the government. It 
divides people into two groups, those paying tax rate t\ , and those paying 
#2. The other two thresholds are and In both income groups 
1 and 2, these thresholds divide people choosing the public option from 




v i  v  y*2
Our claim is that redistribution takes place if richer people choose 
the private option. The proportion of richer people who opt out is taken 
as a measure of redistribution because they pay for the social supply of 
h without using it. Thus, if we had a linear tax schedule, redistribution 
could be achieved by setting ÿ equal to y* which, in turn, would be 
unique.
P roposition  4 If tx =  then y*^ =  y*^  =  y*. Thus, redistribution 
takes place if y =  y*.





























































































If, on the other hand, the basic income tax schedule is not pro­
portional, part of the people whose income is less than y can afford the 
private option, while people whose income is just above ij. cannot afford 
it because of the higher tax rates they are asked to pay.
As for the redistributive power of different mixed fiscal systems 
involving a progressive tax function, the relevant comparison is between 
a) a progressive tax paired with universal public provision of h and, b) 
the same progressive tax paired with selective public provision of h. This 
is because of proposition 3. for which universal public provision of h is 
distributionally neutral. Thus, the mixed fiscal system at point b) above 
is the natural benchmark against which to assess the distributive effects 
of a selective public provision of a private good.
We build an index of redistribution by computing the expenditures 
for h of the two income groups in the two systems. Since the price for 
h is higher for those choosing the private market, a higher expenditure 
for h in the second income group represent the choice for higher quality. 
This choice, when it occurs, reveals a greater redistributive power of the 
second system, as it reveals that richer people opt out of public provision.
3.2.2 The form al analysis
Each individual is supposed to choose between public and private provi­
sion of h by solving the following maximization problem:
(7)
s.t. (1 -  ti)y +  ki =  px +  qshs +  qphp
hghp — 0
hs +  hv >  0
where
0
(h  ~  h )y
i =  1 




























































































variables are defined as above, and the last constraint implies that one of 
the two choices is compulsory. It should be stressed that hs and hp are 
two distinct commodities and that the difference in quality is reflected 
both in the prices (qs < qp) and in the parameters a  and 0. a  and 0 
enter the utility function indicating different abilities in ’’ processing” the 
private composite commodity x. In other words, we are assuming that 
a higher quality of health care gives the recipients higher pleasure from 
private consumption (hence 0 <  a ).12
Thus, each individual, with either tax rate t\ or t2 - will compare the 
utility resulting from optimal choices with the public or private provision 
of h.
First order conditions in the case of universal public provision and 
in the case of selective public provision yield:
• Universal public provision of h.
_ [(1 - t i ) y  +  ki} _ [(1 - t j ) y + hi]
Xs (0+1 )P ' ‘ q.(0 + l )  ’
hp =  0
• Selective public provision of h
xs
xp
(1 -  ti)y + kj 
(0 +  1 )p
(l - t j )y +  kj
(ar + l)p
0 (1 - t j ) y  + ki
0 + 1  qs
hp =  0 (8)
h. =  0, hp — a (1 -U )y  + kj a +  1 qp (9)
where xs and xp differ only by being paired with hs or hp. In 
the latter case, the corresponding optimum values of the utility function 
(indirect utility functions) are
U(x*,h*, 0) =  V(p, qs, y) =  0P[(1 -  t{)y +  ki]0+1/(0 +  l )0+1pq% 
U(x*,0,h*p) =  V[p,qp,y ) =  a“ [(l -  t{)y +  fc<]“+1/ (a  +  l ) a+1pg“
i =  1,2.
12 It is easy to find arguments to support this assumption: for example, if queueing 
time to obtain some medical treatment is sensibly different between the public and 




























































































In turn, these values of the indirect utility functions allow us to 
find the value of income which partitions all individuals into two groups: 
one including those who choose the social provision; the other including 
those who opt for the private one. These two groups are identified by 
the income level (y*) of the individual who is indifferent between the two 
options. This computation, in turn, has to be made for each of the two 
original groups of individuals, i.e. those facing t\ and those facing t2- 
The equality between indirect utility functions yields
(i) [[(1 +  1/ a )“ / ( l  +  1 /0)0}(qp/q^)[(0 +  D / ( «  +  1)1] °lp -  ki
(1 -  u
(10)
y'l 11 as far as t\ <  t2, which is true by construction. In
addition, since y*(1) is the income’s cut-off level for agents whose income is 
less than or equal to y, it cannot be the case that > y (symmetrically, 
y*(2) >  V)■
The necessary and sufficient condition for the indirect utility of 
the private option to be greater than that of the public option, can be 
obtained as follows. Let us define a distance function D (y) =  V{(x, hp) — 
Vi(x,hs) and differentiate it with respect to y. A sufficient condition for 
D(-) to be monotonically increasing in y is
yT > [[(i+ i/*n/[(i + 1/0)%;/ }̂]a% ■
As anticipated in the last paragraph of section 3.2.1, in order to 
see when overall progressiveness is greater than that of the base tax 
function13, we define an index of redistri bution by computing the 
(per capita) expenditures for h of individuals in any of the four income 
groups14. Since the price for h affects only those choosing the private
13 In this paper we concentrate on the reduction of income inequality as a reason­
able property for defining progressiveness. Pfingsten (1986) derives a fairly general 
equivalence of inequality reduction and tax progression.





























































































market, a higher expenditure on h in group 2 than in group 1 is taken 
as a proxy for the number of individuals choosing hp. Consequently, an 
expenditure on h by group 2 greater than by group 1 is interpreted as 
a proxy for progressiveness. The index defined depends on each param­
eter of the model, and this helps us to study the sensitivity of different 
solutions to various parameter values.
Assuming income is lognormally distributed, per capita tax pay­
ments can be expressed as
r , -  f y tiydF(y) 
Jo
for the first income group, and
roo
=  /  [h{y -  y) +  hy}dF (y)
=  t2 exp(/« +  — )
+ (t2 — t\)y l -  $
V a
/ log(y) -  n
for the second one.
Per capita expenditures on the private good h are
( 11)
(12)
Ei =  /  ‘ q,hsdF(y) +  f qphpdF(y)
Jo Jy *
|
=  (1-f1)exp(/i +  — )
a _ a































































































E2 =  qshsd F (y )+  / qphpdF(y) 
Jy J V2




+(«* -  < , » { « *  [*  ( lo6(!' ; ) ~ ' ‘ )  -  *  
'log(ÿ2) -  V
+
l - $
where a* =  ^  and /?* =
Lastly, per capita expenditures in the case of universal public pro­
vision are




S2 =  qahsdF(y) 
Jy
/ lo g (ÿ) -  /*=  ( l - ^ ) e x p  (/* +  — )/?*$
Z \ (7
+(^2 — t\)y(3* 1 -  $




The analysis of progressiveness of the two fiscal arrangements is 
then based on the comparison between r 2/ r 1+ S 2/S i and T2/T1 +  E2/E{ . 
Thus, if [(E2/E\)/(S2/Si )\ > 1 (hereafter IR(t\,t2)), we can claim that 





























































































4 The numerical analysis
The numerical simulation shown in appendix 3 has been performed to 
analyze the behaviour of ) in response to quality and quantity
differences between hs and hp. Our interest is focused on the parameters’ 
values for which IR  is greater than one. since it reveals that the program 
of selective supply of h has a greater redistributive effect than a program 
of universal public provision of h.
• Sensitivity analysis of IR with respect to quality variations
Expectedly, IR 's responsiveness to quality changes shows that the 
index gets higher values when the difference between a  and (3 is higher: 
the quality of the privately supplied good is so attracting that everyone 
who can afford the private option chooses it. When 0/a is very low and 
t\ =  0.2. #2 =  0.4. IR  gets values as greater than one as y is lower: IR  
is approximately equal to 2 when y is equal to ^E(y), but it is relatively 
close to one when y is equal to E(y). When 0/a gets greater than 0.4, 
IR's values are higher when y =  mode(y) which is greater than ^E(y), 
and still greater than in the case of y =  median(y) and y =  E(y). As 
fj/ «  gets closer to one, the value of y which gives the higher value of IR  
moves toward E(y).
What do these figures mean? They essentially mean that a) for any 
ratio between the quality of the public health care and the private health 
care , there is an optimal value for y, i.e. a level of y for which IR  gets 
the highest feasible value; b) redistribution policies are not ’’ additive” : 
higher values of IR  correspond to lower progressive base income taxation 
schedules, both when tax rates are changed and when y varies. As a 
consequence, a central planner could set different values of y or/and f, as 
a response to any actual ratio between the quality of public health care 
and of the private health care (as well as for any other example of private 
good publicly supplied for a redistributive purpose ). Alternatively, he 
could set the ’’ optimal” quality level for the public service, as well as 
regulate the quality of the privately supplied service. The numerical 




























































































there is no need of low values of (3 to obtain high values of IR. Finally, 
IR's sensitivity to tt variations is not very high, but it confirms the 
behaviour observed in the case of y's changes.
• Sensitivity analysis of IR with respect to prices variations
IR  gets closer to one as the ratio between prices of hs and hp 
approximates one. This is only an extreme case, because if prices were 
very similar, almost everyone would choose the higher quality option. 
Unlike the case of quality changes, the index IR  is not higher when the 
difference between prices is greater: when the price for the private option 
is too high, y*^d shifts upwards, as a smaller number of individuals 
can afford it. There is, thus, an optimal ratio of prices for any given 
progressive base tax schedule. For example, when y =  ^E(y), t\ =  0.2, 
t2 — 0.4 and 3/a =  1/4, the optimal price ratio, qs/qP is approximately 
1/3, but becomes even lower when y gets higher. IR's highest levels gets 
lower as basic progressiveness gets higher, both when y and t.; varies.
5 Final remarks
Goods like health care and education are ’mixed goods’in that they are 
only imperfectly ’’public goods” . This is often advanced as one of the 
arguments in favour of a greater private sector provision of this kind of 
goods. This issue is heightened by widespread concern at the growth of 
public expenditure in many countries, especially in Italy . On the other 
hand, the public nature of such goods lies mostly in their redistributive 
power, and the arguments in favour of complete privatization ignore the 
role of redistribution in kind.
In this paper we have investigated the role that the public provision 
of private goods can play in the redistribution of income. Unlike other 
papers available in the literature on redistribution in kind, we investigate 
the issue of the redistributive effects of public provision of private goods 
in a context in which the base taxation system is already progressive. The 




























































































in a simplified version, the Italian income tax system. The model we 
have outlined was solved under the assumption that income followed 
a lognormal distribution . which is the best approximation to the real 
distribution of income in Italy.
Our analysis reveals that while redistributive policy is almost trivial 
for a government whose basic income taxation scheme is linear, this is 
not true in the case of a mixed fiscal policy in which a non-linear tax 
schedule is paired with selective public provision of a private good. We 
have argued that a social programme which aims at selecting poorer 
people for the public provision can increase the progressivity of a pure 
taxation system which is already progressive, while a system of universal 
public provision of private goods does not affect the progressiveness of 
the same base system.
A numerical analysis shows that there is an optimal quality and 
price discrimination for every progressive income taxation schedule, and 
that a greater redistribution could be achieved by combining selective 
public provision of a private good with lower tax rates (or a higher thresh­
old). The same kind of exercise could be repeated for any other income 
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In order to give a simple description o f the Italian income distribution curve, 
two distributions traditionally accounted in such context have been considered: 
the Pareto distribution and the lognormal distribution.
The data, grouped in 19 classes, are published in ISTAT (1993) and 
essentially include: compensation o f employers, proprietors’ income, rental 
income o f persons and o f public institutions and other incomes coming from 
labour, business activities and capital relatively to 1991. Any figure refers to 
gross incomes.
B y using these data, maximum likelihood estimates both for the Pareto 












Empirical and theoretical distribution functions both  for Pareto and 
for lognormal are plotted in figures 9 and 10. The values o f the actual and 
estimated relative frequencies for the two distributions are reported in table 1 
o f Appendix 3. The evidence is clearly in favour o f the lognormal curve.
Further evidence is also given by the two goodness-of-fit tests in the 
table below, in which the Pearson’s X 2 test for Pareto distribution rejects the 
hypothesis at 5% level.
Pareto Lognormal 5% crit.vaJ.
Pearson’s A '2 



































































































Proof of Proposition 1. For 0 <  y <  y:
for y >  y:
t  = Jptjy) dF(y)
f j y d F ( y )  
*1 S p y d F (y )  
Jo y d F (y )  
*i;
in _ t (y )  d F (y )  
f i °  V d F (y )
h  ~  (<2 -  t\)y 
t2 -  (*2 -  h ) y
„J l d F ( y )




exp (/r +  £ ) [ l - - $ |
=
where k =  [ l  — $  ^l°s(y)—a*  ̂j j  j j  _  $  ^los(w)_~t*. _  and <J>() indicates the 
c.d.f. o f  the standard normal distribution.
Since t2 > ti by construction, t" > t' when y < kE{y), being E(y) = 
exp(/t +  <r2/2 ) .  □
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us define y j  =  (1 — t)y  as the post-tax 
income when the tax function is linear. Let also ym — yd F  M  he the incom e 
resulting from a program o f uniform social supply o f  h.
If Yd ~  L N (fi +  lo g ( l  -  t), cr2, 0) then Ym  ~  L N (y  +  lo g (l — t ) ,a 2, M ).  
Let us define the Lorenz curve for Yd and Ym  respectively as (F,;, A (;) , where 
Fd and Ad are the distributions functions o f L N (y  +  lo g (l  — t),cr2,0 )  and 
L N (fi F  lo g (l  — t )  +  <t2,<t2,0 ), and ( F m , A m )- Then 
[ vm l




























































































exp < - (log( j  -  M)  -  p -  log(l -  <)]22̂ -2 (Lr
- ilIM-M 1 =7 eXP S - (log(x) -  /J -  log( 1 -  t )]2xV2tt(t2 
= Fd{y\i ~ M) = Fd(yd)
2 a 2
and, thus. Am (vm) = Ad(yM -  M) -  Ad(yd) for any yM.
Appendix 3
Table 1: Families per monthly income
Monthly income (It.Liras) actual lognormal pareto
0 H 600.000 0.012 0.010 0.277
600.000 H 800.000 0.018 0.021 0.091
800.000 H 1,000,000 0.035 0.035 0.063
1.000,000 H 1,200,000 0.044 0.046 0.047
1,200,000 H 1,400,000 0.057 0.055 0.036
1.400,000 H 1,600,000 0.05 0.059 0.029
1.600,000 H 1,800,000 0.066 0.061 0.024
1,800,000 d 2,000,000 0.043 0.061 0.021
2,000,000 H 2,200,000 0.064 0.058 0.018
2,200,000 H 2,400,000 0.052 0.055 0.016
2.400,000 H 2,600,000 0.053 0.052 0.014
2.600,000 H 2,800,000 0.058 0.048 0.012
2,800,000 H 3,000,000 0.04 0.044 0.011
3.000,000 H 3,200,000 0.049 0.040 0.010
3,200,000 H 3,400,000 0.045 0.036 0.009
3.400,000 d 3,600,000 0.037 0.032 0.008
3.600,000 d 3,800,000 0.035 0.029 0.008
3,800,000 d 4,000,000 0.024 0.026 0.007





























































































Figure 1: Generalized Lorenz curve for tax payments with varying tax rates
XlQ5





























































































Figure 3: Generalized Lorenz curve for post tax income with varying tax rates
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Figure 5: IR versus health care quality
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Figure 7: IH versus health care price
0.9




























































































____ o b s e r v e d ____ estim ateci x lO 6
Figure 9: Pareto distribution
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